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The Massachusetts currency of 1690 was the first inconvertible paper money to be 
supported solely by a legal tender law. The circumstances that led to its creation exceed 
the typical story of wartime specie shortage. Due to temporary political constraints of that 
turbulent period, the currency could be neither backed by land nor granted a full legal 
tender status, as was then standard. Instead, it had to be disguised from England as a 
simple, private-like IOU. By pleasing both its pay-demanding troops and England, the 
government maximized its probability of survival subject to the constraints. 
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Monetary innovation, the development of new forms of money, has not received much systematic 
study from economic historians. 
Richard Sylla, “Monetary Innovation in America” 
 
1. Introduction 
Paper money is one of the most powerful political and economic tools in history. Its 
Chinese inventors supported it first with convertibility but later simply forced everyone to 
accept it in trade (or else). Our modern paper money, in contrast, has a much weaker 
legal status: it merely discharges monetary obligations (e.g., contractual debts and taxes), 
which are denominated in its unit of account. Nobody is obliged to provide tangible 
assets or services for it: neither the government (it has not been convertible, even 
indirectly, since 1971), nor sellers in the marketplace. 
  This latter type of money was invented in Massachusetts in 1690. Economic historians 
have attributed its lack of convertibility to the fact that it was an emergency wartime 
issue and the colony had no specie. This seems like a reasonable hypothesis since it 
happened so many times later. Economic historians have also described this money as a 
natural, almost trivial, development from other paper moneys, such as the 1685 Canadian 
card money and the 1688 Boston banknotes
1. 
  However, further examination of the standard account of the Massachusetts invention 
raises serious doubts as to its accuracy. First, the money was issued after a military defeat 
put the colony in huge debt to its troops. Any previous government that issued paper 
money in such a severe crisis simply forced everyone to accept the new money in trade, 
                                                 
1 Weeden, Economic I, p. 330, Davis, Colonial I, p. 26, Nettels, Money, p. 250, Dorfman, Economic Mind 
I, p. 106, Bailyn, New England, pp. 188-9, Rabushka, Taxation, pp. 358, 360.   3
as in the Chinese tradition
2. Based on its legislative record in general, and that of wartime 
in particular, we would expect the Puritan colony – legendary for excessive regulation – 
to do the same
3. It didn’t. Second, it had been standard practice in Massachusetts to back 
currency and debts with land. This too was not done in 1690. Third, it had also been 
standard practice to make money legal tender for both debts and taxes, but the 1690 
money was officially legal tender only for taxes. Finally, although it is often presented as 
an inconvertible currency – and indeed it was never converted by the government into 
specie or goods – the letter of the law actually did promise such convertibility if possible.  
This paper aims to explain the reasons that led Massachusetts to break with monetary 
tradition (including its own) and dare support a new paper money with such a flimsy law 
at such a critical time. My explanation is based on the unique political situation in 1690. 
Massachusetts was ruled by a provisional local government while its agents in London 
were lobbying for restoration of the colony’s revoked charter. I argue that the objective of 
the political elite was to maximize its chances of surviving in power in both the short run 
and the long run, given peculiar constraints at home and abroad. The bankrupt colony had 
to issue money to its troops to avoid a mutiny (short run), but some of its traditional 
methods of supporting currencies – legal tender for debts and land backing – could have 
upset the king who was then considering charter restoration (long run). In the unique 
regulatory circumstances of 1690, the colony had no legal right to use these methods. The 
                                                 
2 This includes the Canadian case (Shortt, Documents, p. 71), which Massachusetts was familiar with 
(Davis, Colonial I, pp. 195, 201). For other cases see Goldberg, “Invention and Diffusion.” 
3 That year the government eliminated free press (Steele, English, pp. 146-7), restricted marine trade 
(Moody and Simmons, Glorious, henceforth M-S, pp. 186-7, 254, 261, 321, 350), searched and impressed 
goods (PRO CO 5/855 #103), and opened private mail (PRO CO 5/855 #78, CO 5/856 #145).    4
solution to the maximization problem was to disguise the new money as a private-like 
IOU which was not backed by land. This IOU was seemingly not forced on anyone other 
than the government itself and “happened” to be convenient for use as money.  
There is no direct evidence as to the intentions and motives of the Massachusetts 
government as it devised this revolutionary type of money. If indeed there was a clever 
deception perpetrated on the Crown, those involved knew better than to document it. The 
principal contemporary source was Cotton Mather. A supporter of that currency, he 
deliberately destroyed his diary and correspondence of that period
4. My hypothesis, 
which aims to illuminate the odd features of this monetary innovation, is therefore based 
on circumstantial evidence, including other contemporary legislation and the colony’s 
behavior once the imperial constraint abated. 
Richard Sylla has developed a framework for analyzing the determinants of monetary 
innovation
5. He argues that new forms of money are invented when profit-maximizing 
agents attempt to get around regulation. I generalize Sylla’s framework: the profit to be 
maximized can be political rather than economic, and the constraining regulation is not 
necessarily a monetary one (in this case some of it concerns land).   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background and reviews the 
paper money order. Section 3 discusses convertibility and backing. Section 4 deals with 
legal tender for debts and Section 5 relates to legal tender for taxes. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
4 Steele, English, p. 104. 
5 Sylla, “Monetary Innovation in America.”   5
2. Some Basic Facts
6 
In 1684 Massachusetts lost its original charter due to its excessive independence and also 
had to close its mint. In 1686 it became the core of the Dominion of New England, ruled 
by a royal governor. The local elite tried to form a private bank to relieve the scarcity of 
coin. The banknotes were supposed to be backed by both land and a full legal tender 
status (i.e., for both debts and taxes). The bank scheme was aborted in 1688. Following 
the Glorious Revolution, the colonists deposed the governor in 1689. They established a 
provisional government which was tentatively endorsed by the Crown ex-post. They 
joined King William’s War with Canada and the northeastern Natives, while their agents 
in London negotiated with Crown and Parliament about charter restoration.  
  In October 1690 Massachusetts tried and failed to occupy Quebec. Plagued with 
small-pox, frost and starvation, the returning troops demanded pay
7. They received 
debentures which stated how much the colony owed them. The government, which 
counted on expected loot to pay the expenses, imposed new taxes. These were not paid 
quickly enough. Payments for previous expeditions had already been postponed and the 
government could not get away with it again. The threat of mutiny, riot, desertion, or 
even defection, was very real
8. Allowing troops to pay taxes with their debentures
9 was 
not enough. On December 24
th, 1690, an order authorized a five men committee to give  
                                                 
6 A classic reference is Hutchinson, History I. Also see Johnson, Adjustment, and Lovejoy, Glorious. 
7 The main contemporary source is Mather, Pietas, pp. 41-5. It is largely supported by contemporary letters. 
8 Mather, Pietas, p. 44, PRO CO 5/855 #94, 127, 145, CO 5/1081 #188, CO 5/1306 p. 387, Massachusetts 
Archives (henceforth MA) 36:200-1. England’s most memorable naval defeat (Chatham 1667) was caused 
by mass defection and desertion of sailors who were angry for being paid with debentures called “tickets” 
(Davies, Gentlemen, pp. 82-3, Pepys, Diary, 14 June 1667). Some of them even led that Dutch raid.   6
bills ... unto all such persons who shall desire the same, to whom the Colony is indebted for such sum 
or sums of money as they shall have debentures ... every of which bills according to the sums therein 
expressed shall be of equal value with money, and the Treasurer and all the receivers subordinate to 
him shall accept, and receive the same accordingly in all public payments ... the Colony is hereby 
engaged to satisfy the value of said bills as the Treasury shall be enabled. And any person having of 
said bills in his hands, may accordingly return the same to the Treasurer, and shall receive the full 
sum thereof in money, or other public stock at the money price as stated for that time
10. 
The last line requires explanation. Taxes were usually paid in grain according to “money 
prices” set in tax laws (e.g., a bushel of barley was worth 4s in tax liability). The order 
thus decreed two uses of the notes: any payment to the colony could be discharged with 
the notes and if the treasury had specie or other specific goods, these could be used to 
redeem the notes. These uses were also printed on the notes. The order also limited the 
quantity of notes and dealt with counterfeiting and wear and tear.  
3. Convertibility and Backing 
The letter of the law promised convertibility into certain movable goods if and when 
possible. Convertibility into land or backing with land was not mentioned. I will argue 
that the promise that was made was a dead letter. I will then show that land’s absence is 
highly unusual but can be rationalized on political grounds. 
3.1. Convertibility into Movables 
Due to the fact that the treasury was initially empty, the convertibility promise was at first 
an empty one
11. There is no documentation of such conversion actually occurring at the 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 M-S, p. 283.  
10 Modernized spelling. See Massachusetts Court Records VI, pp. 170-1 (reprinted in M-S, pp. 290-1). 
11 Mather, Pietas, p. 43, PRO CO 5/856 #138, Davis, Colonial I, p. 189, Nettels, pp. 262-3.   7
treasury and no contemporary writer even mentions this clause
12. The only documented 
conversion was made by patriotic individuals who voluntarily gave their own specie for 
notes to support the notes’ value
13. This testifies to the treasury’s inability to do so. 
  Convertibility might have been credible if there was hope to obtain specie or goods, 
but this was not the case. The colony never had revenue from selling private goods. It had 
produced coin and supported coin-hungry privateers, but England suppressed these 
activities in the 1680s. The loss in Quebec proved that expected loot was unreliable and 
in any case the war was on hold for the winter
14. Tax receipts were expected to be in 
paper rather than specie or goods, because taxpayers were much happier to get rid of the 
former rather than the latter ones; the colonists were well aware of Gresham’s Law
15. 
Proceeds from land sales could not be relied upon either (see Subsection 3.3). To 
conclude, the weak promise of convertibility into movables was entirely not credible. 
3.2. Absence of Land Backing: An Anomaly 
Land has always been a major security for debt repayment. The chronic specie shortage 
in seventeenth century England and its American colonies expanded the use of land in the 
financial system. Land itself became a medium of payment and was used in the backing 
of paper money. This was especially attractive in the colonies: compared with England, 
they had much less specie and far more land. Payments in land could be made in several 
                                                 
12 Davis, Colonial I, pp. 189-208, PRO CO 5/856 #131, 136, 138, Mather, Pietas, Savage, An Account.  
13 Mather, Pietas, p. 45. 
14 Hutchinson I, p. 336. 
15 Mather, Pietas, p. 44. In Subsection 4.2 I show that even if the treasury had obtained grain somehow, it 
would have used it to pay its other debts, rather than make it available for paper money redemption.   8
instances: before a service was rendered (e.g., bribe
16); given voluntarily as debt 
repayment (e.g., the king’s debt to William Penn, which became Pennsylvania
17); or 
ordered by court as debt repayment (e.g., bankruptcies and deceased people
18).  
  Wars involved unusually large expenses, often involved land disputes, and the victor 
usually gained land. Therefore, war-related payments in land were natural in the Anglo-
American world. Soldiers expected to have a share in the land they defended or 
conquered. As early as 1642 Connecticut paid in land for wartime service
19. Back home, 
Cromwell’s troops were paid with debentures which were convertible into confiscated 
enemy land
20. In 1675, Massachusetts promised land to its troops before a critical battle 
in King Philip’s War, and later it promised that all public lands, towns’ common lands 
and the colony’s interest in conquered lands outside the colony would be held as security 
until all wartime debts were repaid
21. An important scholar speculated that receipts for 
these debts may have circulated as currency
22. The huge area annexed in that war indeed 
made it standard for early 1680s Massachusetts to repay its debts in land. Recipients 
                                                 
16 Jeffries Papers at Massachusetts Historical Society (henceforth MHS), vol. 4 #108. 
17 For examples in Massachusetts see Shurtleff, Records II, pp. 51, 132, 189, MA 45:198, Jeffries Papers, 
vol. 4 #105. 
18 Examples: Trumbull and Hoadly, Public Records III, pp. 170, 175, 198, 218. 
19 Trumbull and Hoadly I, pp. 70, 208, II, pp. 161-2, III, p. 234. 
20 PRO SP 128/42, E 121, Commission on Public Records – Ireland, Annual Report. 
21 Bodge, Soldiers, p. 133, Shurtleff V, p. 71. Perhaps this mortgage of public land was inspired by earlier 
English kings who mortgaged their own land upon taking loans (Ashton, The Crown, pp. 60-4, 127). 
22 Nettels, p. 251.   9
included war veterans, wartime suppliers and creditors, English creditors who helped 
lobbying in London, and magistrates on special missions
23.  
  Land backing was also used in financial institutions. Land banks would lend 
banknotes in return for mortgages. In case of default a borrower’s land could be sold and 
the proceeds could be used to redeem outstanding notes held by others
24. These ideas 
were used in Boston in clearinghouses which operated in 1671 and 1681-83,
25 and in the 
aborted land bank of 1686-88.  
  In addition to this institutional experience with land as the basis of credit and as an 
alternative to specie, there are personal connections between that monetary tradition and 
the 1690 paper money. The presumed architect of the paper money is Magistrate Elisha 
Hutchinson, who headed the paper money committee and dominated war finance issues 
that year
26. He had been an officer of the aborted land bank. Apart from the treasurer, the 
other committee members all shared similar backgrounds: Adam Winthrop had been a 
trustee of the second clearinghouse and a bank officer; Speaker of the House Penn 
Townsend had been a bank officer; and Timothy Thornton had been a clearinghouse 
                                                 
23 Shurtleff V, pp. 343, 408-9, 441-2, 490, 515, MA 3:353a, 354, 69:173a, 70:119-20, 126:269, Lewis, 
Massachusetts, p. 165. For Plymouth examples see MA 128:27, MHS Collections (1861), p. 178. Charity 
cases, such as wounded veterans and veterans of England’s wars, applied for land without claiming a legal 
right (MA 45:201-2, 70:148, 112:398-9, 126:358a, 127:234, 303, 128:69, 240). Some of them did get land. 
24 Horsefield, British, passim, Davis, Currency II, ch. I-III. 
25 Davis, Colonial I, pp. 112, 116, Dorfman, p. 94, Davis, “The Fund,” p. 258. 
26 He was listed first in the order, even before the treasurer. He was the only man on all the main war-
related fiscal committees (M-S, pp. 228, 249, 251, 277-8, 284), and is the only one on record relying on 
expected Canadian loot to pay that expedition’s costs (PRO CO 5/855 #75). One of two open letters about 
the money was addressed to him (Davis, Colonial I, p. 197).    10
customer
27. The magistrates in 1690 included: Wait Winthrop, one of the bank’s four 
senior officers; James Russell, treasurer during the 1680s when land dominated debt 
repayment, and a bank officer; and Isaac Addington, a bank officer. Commissioner 
William Stoughton had been a senior bank officer and was one of those magistrates who 
had been personally paid with land
28. Many other legislators were among those who 
voted for such payments in the 1680s. 
  The leaders of both the clearinghouses and the bank were not in office in 1690. 
However, they still held influence. The presumed manager of the clearinghouses, John 
Woodbridge, communicated with the General Court in December 1690 on another issue, 
and could have contributed to the monetary discussion
29. More importantly, the bank 
leader, Englishman John Blackwell, was the foremost financial expert in America. As 
Cromwell’s Treasurer of Army his opinion was widely sought, especially on financial 
matters
30. He actively promoted the paper money right after it was issued
31. There can be 
no doubt that he was consulted about it. The conditional convertibility clause in the paper 
money order was probably inspired by an identical clause in the prospectus of 
                                                 
27 The people involved with the bank and clearinghouse are listed in MA 127:66, 69, and Davis, “The 
Fund,” pp. 259, 262, respectively. Office holders in 1690 are listed in M-S, pp. 241-2, 285. 
28 Shurtleff V, p. 343.  
29 M-S, p. 294. 
30 He had been consulted with “on all affairs” (Toppan, Randolph IV, p. 113) and had chaired a standing 
committee on trade (Toppan “Dudley Records,” pp. 248-9). He had just returned from a short governorship 
of Pennsylvania (PRO CO 5/855 #94). Back in England in 1691, both the Crown and Massachusetts agents 
consulted him regarding the charter (CO 391/7 pp. 7-8, Mather, Diary, 15 Sep., 30 Oct.). 
31 In January 1691 he wrote an open letter about it (Davis, Colonial I, pp. 206-7).   11
Blackwell’s bank
32. Interestingly, decades earlier he had personally dealt with the 
wartime conversion of debentures into confiscated enemy land in England and Ireland
33.  
  Given the success and prevalence of this financial use of land in all previous wars
34, 
and the numerous personal connections to land-backed financial institutions, it is 
remarkable that land is completely absent from the records in 1689-90. Before and after 
each of this period’s three expeditions, troops were promised a share of the plunder, 
while loans were secured by future tax revenues or plunder. Land was not promised 
before any expedition nor given after it
35. The notes were neither convertible into land 
nor backed by it. Even an empty promise was not made regarding land backing, as was 
made about specie and goods.  
3.3. No Land Backing: An Explanation 
The most likely reason for the lack of land backing is the land policy of Sir Edmund 
Andros, the royal governor of the Dominion of New England (1686-89). He voided all 
the land titles in Massachusetts
36. His main legal argument was that with the revocation 
of the charter all the lands reverted to the Crown. I argue elsewhere that this policy killed 
Blackwell’s land bank in 1688.
37 Andros’s land policy was so shocking that it served to 
unite all political parties against him, and led to the 1689 revolution that deposed him. 
                                                 
32 Davis, Colonial I, p. 139. 
33 Dorfman, p. 97. He represented himself and other debenture-holding troops (PRO E 121/4/8 #35). 
34 In earlier wars many new lands were eventually won from the Natives, notwithstanding initial losses. 
Land losses as of late 1690 were “not fourth” of the desolation in King Philip’s War (PRO CO 5/856 #150). 
35 MA 35:52a, 107:271a, 288a, M-S, pp. 248, 256, 284.  
36 Barnes, Dominion, ch. VIII, Lewis, ch. X. 
37 Goldberg, “Rise and Fall.”   12
However, the implications of his land policy lingered on. The warring new king delayed 
his policy decisions about Massachusetts until the fall of 1691. Only then was Andros’s 
claim of royal ownership of all the lands explicitly overruled. Until then it was doubtful 
whether either the colony or the colonists really owned any land.  
  It is clear that land was still a major problem when paper money was created. In 
November 1690 and January 1691 the London agents asked for a blanket confirmation of 
all old land titles in a draft of a new charter. It was erased from later drafts, but at the last 
moment chief lobbyist Increase Mather managed to put it back in
38. In October 1691 
Mather informed the colony about the new charter. His letter opened as follows:  
The charter for the Massachusetts colony passed the great seal on the sixteen instant [i.e., October 
16
th]. The king reserves power to himself to appoint the governor, deputy governor, and secretary. 
But all men’s properties are confirmed as before the judgment against the old charter
39. 
Mather then mentioned some of his greatest achievements: an elected assembly, limits on 
the governor’s powers, the annexation of Plymouth, Maine, and Nova Scotia, and the first 
ever shipment of desperately needed ammunition. The fact that Mather started the good 
news with “properties” (i.e., land
40), proves how critical the issue was to the colonists, 
and attests its uncertainty until October 1691. The letter was addressed to a close friend, 
John Richards, one of the few Massachusetts leaders who were not heavily involved in 
the real estate market
41. Mather’s leading apologist – his son Cotton – wrote “political 
                                                 
38 M-S, pp. 468-9, 518, 555-6, PRO CO 5/855 #130, CO 5/856 #158XXXI, 158XXXIV, 158XXXV, 183, 
192, CO 391/7 p. 42, Whitmore, Andros II, pp. 283-4.  
39 Modernized spelling. See M-S, pp. 620-1. 
40 This interpretation of “properties” is proved by Mather’s other writing (e.g., Whitmore II, pp. 121-122). 
41 Lewis, p. 429.   13
fables” to market his father’s achievements to the ungrateful colonists. In half of them he 
emphasized that all land owners owed gratitude to his father for the confirmation of their 
titles
42. Even the charter’s confirmation was not enough to ease concern, so a 1692 act 
guaranteed title to those whose land possession had been uncontested for three years
43.  
  To return to the climate of late 1690, land anxiety must have been at its peak because 
the late Dominion’s entire leadership had been exonerated in England and seemed to be 
returning to high ranking jobs in America and perhaps even in Massachusetts
44. This 
possibility was terrifying. Leading legislators were personally hurt by his policy, 
notwithstanding their involvement with Blackwell’s bank
45. Magistrate Hutchinson lost 
his Maine land in 1686 to Maine’s Deputy-Secretary John West due to a supposedly 
defective title. West then became Andros’s Deputy-Secretary and Registrar of land titles. 
Similar persecution of land titles suspiciously began in Massachusetts immediately 
thereafter
46. Hutchinson had also led the most important land speculation venture 
(Atherton), which was sabotaged by Andros. He went to England to lobby for Andros’s 
removal. Andros’s worst attack on land titles was the issue of writs of intrusion against 
                                                 
42 Whitmore II, pp. 317, 326, 330. 
43 Hutchinson II, p. 49, Goodell, Acts I, p. 41. 
44 Andros was rumored to return as governor of Massachusetts or New York (also in the Dominion) 
(Sewall, Diary I, p. 333, Hall, Randolph, p. 131, Hall, Last, pp. 233-4, Lovejoy, p. 342). Others were 
Lieutenant-Governor Nicholson (Sewall, pp. 270, 321-2), President Dudley (PRO CO 5/1081 #161, 180) 
and Attorney General Graham (Graham to Nicholson, April 6
th, 1691, Blathwayt Papers X, folder 5). 
Eventually, they all ended up in either New York or Virginia.  
45 For details and references see Goldberg, “Rise and Fall.” 
46 Hutchinson had also been a specialist in government’s grants of vacant land (MA 45:183-183a, 100:291, 
382-3). These lands were to become Andros’s most favorite target.   14
five landowners. Three of them would be legislators in 1690.
47 Magistrate Wait Winthrop 
was also an Atherton partner and his sisters were also hurt by Andros’s policy. The 
possibility of an Andros return startled the colonists to the point of publishing an insider 
account of his reign in February 1691.
48 Some of his former councilors strongly 
condemned his land policy in this signed document. This is significant because most 
political publications were anonymous and Andros had been exonerated in 1690 because 
no colonist dared signing the allegations against him
49. The persistent rumors of his 
return prompted the colonists to take this unusual measure. Signatories included 
Stoughton and Winthrop, senior bank officers and members of the 1690 government. 
  In conclusion, as of December 1690, all the land possessed by the colony and any land 
that could have been won in the war apparently belonged to the king. The king could 
have confirmed Andros’s policy and could have been angry at the General Court for 
giving his land away, or for promising his land as backing for the colony’s paper money. 
Avoiding any reference to land seemed like the safest course of action while the colony’s 
new charter was being drafted in London.  
  Such caution is consistent with general colonial behavior. Rhode Island and 
Connecticut were very friendly to the Crown while waiting for a charter in the 1660s.
50 
                                                 
47 These were Magistrates Sewall and Russell and Deputy Joseph Lynde. Would-be committee member 
Townsend and Magistrates Winthrop and Addington were formally involved in Sewall’s 1687 taking 
possession of the land that would be targeted by Andros in 1688 (Sewall, p. 176, Sewall Papers at MHS, 
after 20 July 1688 entry).  
48 Whitmore I, pp. 133-147. 
49 PRO CO 391/6 p. 323. 
50 Hall, Randolph, p. 11, Lovejoy, p. 128.   15
Most New England colonists were very risk averse in 1689-90 regarding their 
constitutional status, fearing royal disapproval. They did not revive their old charters after 
unilaterally dissolving the Dominion, even though the Dominion had been established, 
and the charters revoked or suspended, by the new king’s enemies (the deposed 
Stuarts)
51. Before the new king explicitly approved the revolutionary Massachusetts 
government, its members feared exercising authority on taxation
52. It also made sense to 
wait for a royal statement on land before acting as if it was theirs. 
4. Legal Tender for Debts? 
Legal tender laws are very limited by nature. They only settle disputes about the medium 
of payment of an obligation that already exists. One such obligation is a contractual debt 
that needs to be discharged after a commodity had been delivered. Another example is a 
tax. Contrary to common belief, legal tender laws do not force anyone to sell on the spot 
for legal tender currency (there is no debt to settle yet), and they do not prohibit parties 
from agreeing on another medium of payment
53. 
  Massachusetts regularly made its currency legal tender for all debts. From the opening 
of the Boston mint (1652) to the prohibiting Currency Act (1751), only one other act 
authorizing new currency did not make it legal tender for debts
54. Why was the 1690 
currency an exception? Or was it? I will first discuss the absence of formal legal tender 
                                                 
51 Sosin, English America, pp. 216, 221. 
52 Lewis, p. 334. 
53 For some official explanations, see http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqcur.htm#2 , 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/about/faqs.htm . Also see Goldberg, “Legal Tender.” 
54 It was in the first issue of provincial notes (1702). The omission was fixed later (Goodell I, pp. 504, 701).   16
provisions regarding debts. I will then show that another, seemingly unrelated order, 
practically made paper money legal tender for debts albeit in an indirect way. 
4.1. Not Legal Tender for Debts (de jure) 
In early Massachusetts the lack of a convenient medium of paying obligations hampered 
the settlement of contractual debts. In 1652 the colony started minting its own coins and 
made them legal tender for debts: if a contract denominated in pounds had been created 
without specifying the medium of payment, these coins were good enough to discharge 
the debt at face value, and the creditor could not sue for breach of contract
55. 
  After the Restoration the mint had been repeatedly portrayed as one of the colony’s 
worst offenses against the Crown. While other offenses involved violations of 
Parliamentary laws (e.g., Acts of Navigation), coinage was a direct violation of the royal 
prerogative
56. To add insult to injury, the 1652 coinage order referred to Massachusetts as 
“this commonwealth
57.” Some royalists considered this high treason. The first complaint 
was made by visiting English commissioners in 1665.
58 Edward Randolph, who led the 
fight to revoke the colony’s charter, made the coinage offense one of his favorite targets. 
He mentioned it tirelessly, often at the top of his list, and he was not alone in doing so
59. 
The king forced the colony’s agents to beg for his pardon only for this particular offense. 
He was furious when he later learned that coinage continued nevertheless
60. The 
                                                 
55 Shurtleff IV-I, p. 84.  
56 The charter was almost lost already in 1635 due to other violations of the prerogative (CO 5/856 #158I). 
57 Shurtleff IV-I, p. 84. 
58 Shurtleff IV-II, p. 213. 
59 PRO CO 1/41 #35, 50-1, CO 391/2 pp. 96, 104, Toppan, Randolph III, p. 96, CO 1/47 #44, CO 1/52 #4. 
60 PRO CO 1/41 #29-31, CO 1/42 #15I, CO 1/47 #79, CO 5/904 p. 177, CO 391/2 pp. 103, 240-1.   17
complaints referred to the debasement of coins, the absence of the king’s portrait or 
name, and – more importantly – the legal tender status
61. Only the king could force the 
acceptance of a certain object in settlement of debts. Later on in England, plans for note-
issuing banks would be disqualified for asking that their private notes be legal tender. 
The Bank of England was approved by Parliament only after dropping this request
62.  
  In 1684 the charter was revoked even though the mint closed. The colonists asked to 
re-open the mint in 1686, but the Crown objected because of the debasement
63. In 1689 
Mather tried to revive the old charter in London. This attempt only revived the details of 
the colony’s offenses, including coinage
64. Mather learned his lesson and only asked for 
liberty of coinage in 1691 when it was clear that the old charter could not be revived
65.  
  Officially issuing paper money with a full legal tender status in 1690, while charter 
negotiations climaxed, would have been a colossal mistake. While England repeatedly 
objected to the Massachusetts coins which were 22.5% debased, the paper money issue 
would amount to opening a mint with 100% debasement. In general, the colony’s leaders 
were aware that the charter battle in London was tough and nasty, and they did not want 
                                                 
61 Toppan, “Dudley Records,” p. 244, PRO CO 1/41 #50, CO 1/47 #44, CO 5/940 p. 139. It was especially 
a problem that England-based creditors were forced to accept these debased colonial coins.  
62 Horsefield, pp. 126, 160, 211. 
63 Toppan, “Dudley Records,” p. 244, PRO CO 5/904 pp. 319-26. 
64 PRO CO 5/905 pp. 55-6, 79, 142, Hall, Leder, and Kammen, Glorious, p. 69, Whitmore II, p. 140, III, 
pp. 5, 16, 226). Most of these documents were presented before the Lords of Trade or Parliament. 
65 M-S, p. 514, PRO CO 391/7 p. 76.    18
to give ammunition to their enemies
66. At least four of the leaders knew how damaging it 
could be to violate the coinage prerogative again. Richards (a former and soon-to-be 
magistrate) and Stoughton (one of the two commissioners) were among the agents who 
had begged the king to pardon the original coinage offense years earlier. Samuel Sewall 
(the other commissioner and a magistrate) and Hutchinson (one of two commissioners-in-
reserve and a magistrate) had helped Mather’s lobbying in London in 1689 and witnessed 
first hand the lingering damage of that old coinage offense
67. The positions of 
commissioner and commissioner-in-reserve were diplomatic ones, which meant that 
during the May 1690 elections, these were the most trusted persons in diplomatic affairs.  
While the colonists got away with the coinage offense for decades under Charles II, 
they could not hope to be so lucky with the new king. New to London from the world’s 
financial center (The Netherlands), William of Orange and his advisors were much more 
sophisticated in these matters
68. The conclusion was clear: while paper money had to be 
issued to please the troops, it had to look as if it was not money.  
The solution was to make the paper money look like a simple credit instrument, an 
IOU, which happened to be issued by a colonial government. There was nothing illegal or 
                                                 
66 In November and December 1690 the General Court warned both Crown and agents that the colony’s 
actions would be maliciously “misrepresented” by others (M-S, pp. 288, 412-3). 
67 As heir of the closed Boston mint (Sewall I, p. xviii), Sewall had to be interested in money. He and 
Hutchinson toured the London Mint in 1689 (Sewall I, pp. 253, 256). He also gave a rare 1712 testimony 
on the 1690 issue (Sewall II, p. 366).  
68 The colonists may have known that in July 1690 he revalued the token coin that his enemy James I was 
issuing in Ireland (National Museum of Ireland – Decorative Arts and History, Airgead).   19
sovereign-like about that, as anyone was allowed to issue IOUs.
69 At the time, a typical 
IOU included the following five features: first, it was convertible into specie or goods; 
second, it had an indenture as the symbol of contract
70; third, it was not forced on anyone; 
fourth, the issuer was expected to accept it in offsetting debts owed to him, following the 
Common Law’s setoff rule
71; and fifth, it was not called “money.”  
Massachusetts gave its 1690 money all these features. First, it made an (empty) 
promise of convertibility (see Subsection 3.1). The order’s preamble explicitly stated that 
the notes would merely postpone the real payment to a more “convenient time.” Second, 
the notes were indented. Third, the letter of the law did not force the money on any 
person. Nobody, including the troops, had to receive it for the government’s debts or 
private debts, use it in trade, or pay taxes with it. Fourth, the order did force the 
government itself to accept the notes in offsetting the government’s debts (notes) against 
its credits (taxes), if taxpayers chose to pay taxes with the notes. Fifth, the notes were 
called “bills” in both the authorizing order and on the face of the notes, rather than “paper 
money” or “money
72.” The convenient denominations and easy transferability did not 
disqualify the notes as IOUs. Assignability of bonds was standard there
73. 
                                                 
69 Horsefield, pp. xii-xiv, surveys these instruments in England. For usage in Massachusetts see MA 
36:281, 100:389, 128:121, M-S, p. 121, Jeffries Papers, vol. 4 #2, 13, 148. Also see Davis, Colonial I, p. 
191, Trumbull and Hoadly I, p. 512. 
70 Weeden, p. 330. 
71 Offsetting debts is known to have been practiced by neighboring colonial treasuries: Trumbull and 
Hoadly I, p. 34, II, p. 142, Konig, Plymouth, vol. 1, pp. 204, 207. 
72 The latter is also noted in Rabushka, Taxation, p. 360. Sewall mentioned “bills” in unsecure 
correspondence to England (MHS Collections [1886], p. 115). In his private business papers in January   20
This tactic was in line with the colonists’ new rhetoric, which emphasized their rights 
as Englishmen
74. As Englishmen, they could not create legal tender money but did have 
the right to issue IOUs.
75 As mentioned in Section 2, the troops first received debentures, 
which they could use in tax payments. The paper money order merely allowed them to 
convert these debentures into other debentures, which were conveniently denominated 
and easily transferable. While for economists the latter would be considered money, for 
the Crown the ultimate test for money was the formal name “money” or a legal tender 
status for debts. In general, hair-splitting rhetoric was a second nature to the colonists 
when dealing with England. For example, after deposing Andros this revolutionary 
government governed “according to the rules” of the old revoked charter without 
formally reviving the charter itself
76. Analogously, one might say that the notes 
functioned according to the rules of money but were not formally money. 
  The government’s fear of being caught issuing money was well founded. The money 
issue and its dismal performance were reported to London by the government’s enemies, 
                                                                                                                                                 
1691 he used “bill” once and “money-bills” twice (Sewall Papers at MHS). Leading contemporary 
colonists scolded those who called it “paper money” (Davis, Colonial I, pp. 189, 204). The name “bills of 
credit” was officially used only from February 1691 (M-S, pp. 296-7). Earlier Connecticut debentures had 
been called “bills of debts” (Trumbull and Hoadly I, p. 273).  
73 See references in footnote 69. In 1687 Connecticut authorized assigning all the private bills given to the 
treasury to pay the treasury’s debts (Trumbull and Hoadly III, p. 224). 
74 It was mainly used to justify the 1689 revolution and the first ever plea for English military aid. See 
Lovejoy, pp. 292-3, 377, Johnson, pp. 129-34, 196, fn. 27, PRO CO 5/855 #71.  
75 Leading contemporary colonists also wrote about the money as an ordinary credit instrument (Davis, 
Colonial I, pp. 189-206, Mather, Pietas, p. 45).  
76 M-S, p. 89.    21
who were quick to employ the terms “bank,” “money,” “paper money,” and “a new mint 
raised here of paper money.” One letter explicitly claimed that the prerogative had been 
violated
77. As these letters arrived to London in 1691, several memoranda on the old 
charter revocation were prepared in Whitehall to facilitate an informed decision on the 
colony’s future. Some of them again raised the old coinage offense
78. And yet, there is no 
evidence that anyone in London compared the new paper money to the old illegal coins. 
It seems that the trick worked. The colony got away with issuing paper money and 
received a reasonably good charter in October 1691.  
The new charter did not allow coinage, but it provided political insurance. It created a 
new mechanism that sent all new acts to England for approval. This guaranteed that the 
new charter could not be revoked like its predecessor just because the king disapproved 
of certain acts. With the risk of revocation removed, the colonists immediately restored 
their own monetary tradition: in the very first legislative session under the new charter, 
all future notes were formally made legal tender for both debts and taxes
79. In the worst 
case this act would have been vetoed by the king, without endangering the charter. Since 
the colony had formally made all earlier currencies full legal tender and made this change 
only after the new charter was secured, it proves that political considerations were the 
only impediment to a formal full legal tender status in 1690.  
 
                                                 
77 PRO CO 5/856 #131, 136, 138, Foxcroft to Blathwayt, April 16
th, 1691 (Blathwayt Papers V 5). 
78 PRO CO 5/856 #158VII, 158X, 158XI, 158XII, 158XIV, 158XVI. It often topped the list of offenses.  
79 Goodell I, p. 36. Since the notes already circulated at par, it was probably done just to solve standard 
contractual disputes. There was no such benefit from giving land to the 1690 troops. The latter happened 
only when public sympathy favored them as they were passing away in the 1730s (e.g., MA 36:246-7).    22
4.2. Legal Tender for Debts (de facto)  
On the same day that the paper money order passed, another, seemingly unrelated order 
passed as well. It did not refer to the war or to paper money. The entire order stated: 
Ordered that all country pay with one third abated shall pass as current money to pay all country’s 
debts at the same prices set by this court; except what has been borrowed in money shall be paid in 
money
80. 
“Country pay” meant grain and other goods authorized as legal tender for taxes. Because 
some of the colony’s leaders privately lent specie to buy supplies for the expedition, they 
guaranteed that they would be paid back in specie
81.  
  But the key is the first sentence. Why is this order (henceforth, the commodity money 
order) relevant for paper money? Recall that the paper money order offers troops “who so 
desire” paper money as wage payment (Section 2). Consider, for example, a soldier who 
had a debenture for 60s. He could exchange the debenture for 60s in paper money. 
According to the latest tax order of October 25
th, 1690, barley was priced for tax purposes 
at 4s per bushel. Since this pricing was adopted in the commodity money order, a debt of 
60s was worth fifteen bushels of barley. But this commodity money order had “one third 
abated,” so the treasury actually could discharge the debt with ten bushels of barley. A 
soldier not believing in paper money faced the risk of being offered ten bushels of barley. 
A refusal to accept this low quantity of barley would void the colony’s debt to him.  
  This casts a heavy shadow on the paper money order, for troops who rejected paper 
money actually could have been punished. In fact, this commodity money order that 
made grain legal tender for government debts indirectly made the paper money – to some 
                                                 
80 Modernized spelling. See Massachusetts Court Records VI, p. 171 (reprinted in M-S, p. 292). 
81 One of them, Timothy Thornton, was in the paper money committee (MA 100:452).   23
extent – legal tender for government debts. To see why this is the case, note that if the 
abatement had been 100% rather than one third, a soldier rejecting the notes would have 
the government debt to him discharged with exactly zero bushels of barley. He would 
have lost his entire wage as a penalty for rejecting the notes. That is what legal tender 
means: a creditor who rejects it cannot insist on getting paid in any other way. While the 
penalty was not 100%, it did apply to a huge debt (₤40,000), which dwarfed any private 
debt in 1690 Massachusetts. Therefore, de facto, until the government finished paying the 
troops, the paper money was somewhat legal tender for debts. 
  Why did Massachusetts choose one third rather than, say, one half? Its legislative 
history of commodity money was full of anti-grain abatements. The tax orders which set 
grain prices for tax payments regularly discriminated against grain, in order to encourage 
tax payments in specie. An abatement of one third for payment in specie had been the 
standard, and was used four times in one year just before December 1690.
82 The 
abatement of December 1690 mirrored these abatements: instead of benefiting those who 
would give specie as payment of an obligation to the government, this order benefited 
those  receiving an intrinsically useless object as payment of an obligation from the 
government. This analogy justified using the same measure of one third.  
  This order, which must have induced troops to accept paper money, has gone 
completely unnoticed by the government’s enemies, England, and monetary historians
83.  
Even the Massachusetts Archives composer, Joseph Felt, missed it upon composing his 
                                                 
82 Shurtleff V, passim (beginning in p. 139), M-S, pp. 173, 224-5, 280, 283.   
83 It affected only the troops, while the government’s enemies who sent letters to England were not among 
the troops. The published account attributed to Thomas Savage, an officer who fought in Quebec, includes 
a discussion of paper money which he never wrote. See Goldberg, “Savage,” for an analysis of this forgery.   24
widely used collection of monetary laws
84. The order has two features that make it 
inconspicuous and hard to relate to paper money. First, in all the analogous tax orders, the 
anti-grain discrimination was always made upfront in the same order. The December 
1690 anti-grain measure should have been in the paper money order itself, as follows: 
“Bills will be given to those troops who so desire, while others will get grain with one 
third abated.” Instead, what we have is a paper money order which does not punish 
anyone, while the implicit sanction is in an order that does not mention paper money. 
Moreover, this separate order is “buried” in the General Court records. The lengthy paper 
money order is followed by four short orders regarding debt payments to specific 
individuals. The commodity money order was inserted in the middle of these orders. It 
has about the same length as these personal orders, and opens with the same words.  
These features are probably an accident, resulting from a bicameral legislature: the 
magistrates initiated the paper money order, while the deputies initiated the commodity 
money order. However, it is not inconceivable that this was purposefully done. If 
England had noticed this order and its meaning, the whole ploy would have been 
considered merely another violation of the coinage prerogative. Some later Anglo-
American governments certainly did display deceptive behavior, using technical tricks to 
make paper money a de facto legal tender for debts
85. Such a scenario is also consistent 
                                                 
84 Felt, Historical Account. It is in his errata (p. 250) but misdated as October 24
th and thus taken out of 
context. It was really dated “ X
ber ” (MA 36:259b-c), which meant “December” (e.g., PRO CO 5/855 #127). 
85 England was reluctant to make the nominally-private Bank of England notes legal tender, so it forced 
official debt collectors (rather than the creditors) to accept the notes (Nussbaum, Money, pp. 47-8). Facing 
the constitutional prohibition on state legal tender laws, Kentucky enacted a two-year delay to lawsuits by 
creditors who rejected the state’s favorite private paper money (Hurst, Legal, pp. 140-5).   25
with Massachusetts political history. Its leaders were formidable political players. They 
promised convertibility into objects they did not have. They did not call their currency as 
such. They even manipulated the notes’ acceptance for taxes (see below). They had a 
long and very successful tradition of tricks. Using procrastination, pretensions, bribes, 
subterfuges, hair-splitting rhetoric and half-truths, they secured their autonomy for a 
generation after the Restoration
86.  
5. Legal Tender for Taxes 
Another component of most legal tender laws is acceptance of the money for taxes. As 
mentioned above, it could be interpreted as offsetting debts between the government and 
the taxpayers who hold the notes. There was no reason to fear an English response to this 
measure. If anything, it helped create the impression that the notes were nothing more 
than private-like IOUs. The problem in this case is different. Given that there was no 
backing with tangible assets and a limited legal tender status for debts (concerning only 
the soon-to-be-discharged government debt to troops), the government had to trust that 
the tax measure alone would be sufficient to indefinitely support the money’s circulation. 
With the first scholarly text on the topic almost a century away from being published 
(Adam Smith), how did the colonists come to trust the power of this measure?
87 
  The chronic lack of specie forced all colonies to accept tax payments in goods. To 
prevent disputes between taxpayers and tax collectors, the government regularly set 
prices of specific types of goods for tax payments. In December 1690 a tax liability of 
60s could be discharged with fifteen bushels of barley because the latest such order set 
                                                 
86 Hutchinson I, Johnson, Sosin, p. 11. 
87 For a mathematical model of this mechanism see Starr, “The Price of Money.”   26
barley at 4s per bushel
88. The goods had to be of “merchantable” quality and the treasury 
typically passed the goods on to its own creditors. The set prices were usually adjusted to 
market rates once a year
89. Over time sellers learned the minimal quality of goods that the 
treasury accepted for taxes. Consider a shop keeper in 1690, being offered by a farmer 
fifteen bushels of barley of sufficiently good quality as payment. He knew that this barley 
could at the very least be used to discharge 60s of his (or others’) tax liability. A drop in 
the market price of barley did not matter. The tax law’s prices put a lower bound on the 
value of these goods. It is likely that during the half century that this system existed, 
many sellers accepted grain at a certain price, only because they knew it had a sure value 
in tax payments. This increased the demand for grain, including grain of marginal quality. 
  Producers of other types of money understood how important this mechanism was for 
increasing the value of money. John Hull, the monopolist mint master and the colony’s 
treasurer, proposed to legislate an exceptionally large discount in taxes for those who 
would pay them in his coin rather than grain. He probably pushed for those rare tax laws 
that even forced taxpayers to use coin for a fraction of their payments
90. He might have 
been more concerned with demand for his coins than efficient tax collection. Similarly, 
Blackwell’s private banknotes were made legal tender for all debts and taxes when the 
bank’s directors controlled the government in 1686.
91 Hull’s heir (Sewall) and the many 
                                                 
88 M-S, p. 279. The first such law is from 1635 (Shurtleff I, p. 140). 
89 Shurtleff, passim. 
90 MA 100:239, 261, Shurtleff V, pp. 156, 324, 376-7, 417, 505. 
91 MA 126:103-7. In addition to Blackwell, the bank’s directors were President Dudley, Deputy-President 
Stoughton, and Councilor Wait Winthrop (MA 127:66).   27
bank officers who were involved with the 1690 paper money knew the power of this 
mechanism. Their trust in it is therefore not surprising. 
  In some sense there was only one novel aspect in the 1690 money, compared to grain, 
local coins, and Blackwell’s banknotes: being intrinsically useless and unbacked, it took 
this mechanism to its mathematical limit. It promised that pieces of paper would 
discharge tax liabilities according to their face value. Every seller was supposed to 
understand that no matter what the acceptability of notes in the market was, they were 
still useful for tax payments. The guarantee that 1s in paper discharged a 1s tax liability 
was supposed to put a lower bound on the notes’ value. The intrinsic uselessness of the 
notes was not supposed to matter to sellers any more than they had cared about the 
quality of grain as commodity money (so long as it was acceptable at the treasury). The 
only difference from Gresham’s Law is that they just wanted to get the “bad” money to 
circulate and cared far less about the fate of “good” moneys.  
  This mechanism is related to the tax-backing theory which was argued in the later 
colonial context
92, but the crux of the matter is different. The issue here is whether the 
currency’s value will be bounded away from zero, i.e., whether it will be accepted at all. 
The tax-backing theory takes the currency’s acceptance as given and argues about the 
price level. The colonists may have viewed tax acceptance as not only sufficient for 
circulation but also as necessary, given the absence of other backing: if the issuer itself 
would not accept the notes, why should anyone else accept them? 
  There was some manipulation regarding this measure as well. The colonists knew that 
it would be even more effective if the paper money would be the only acceptable medium 
                                                 
92 E.g., Smith, “Some Colonial Evidence.”   28
of paying taxes. But such a status would be inconsistent with the IOU-like appearance 
that they gave the money. The government therefore proceeded gradually. In February 
1691 those paying taxes in notes got a 5% discount. In May 1691, paying in goods 
involved a one third penalty
93. All later taxes were imposed without the traditional 
mentioning of goods at all, meaning that goods were no longer legal tender for taxes. The 
treasury was thus allowed to reject them or accept them at any rate it wanted.  
6. Conclusion 
Massachusetts faced a unique combination of imperial regulations: it could not formally 
grant a full legal tender status to its money and it could not back it with land. Issuing 
money with a full legal tender status would have been injurious to the king’s sovereignty. 
Backing it with his(?) land would have added insult to injury. The government was 
aiming to maximize political profit. In the short run this required pacifying the troops 
(i.e., issue money), and in the long run it required getting an autonomous charter from the 
king (i.e., don’t issue money, especially with land backing). Stuck between a rock and a 
hard place, Massachusetts invented a currency that did not rely on land and looked as a 
private-like IOU, although it really was an inconvertible legal tender.  
It is sometimes problematic to analyze innovation as a profit-maximizing activity
94. 
However, this invention did not come out of the blue since all the ingredients had already 
been there. One can imagine the government writing a checklist of all the ways it could 
support paper money, and then taking out those which were too risky. It was the peculiar 
combination of constraints that resulted in a unique outcome.  
                                                 
93 M-S, pp. 296-7, 316. Both measures were relative to payment in specie.  
94 Mokyr, Lever.   29
  My hypothesis regarding the government’s intention is based on the serious and 
otherwise inexplicable differences between the 1690 paper money order and the 
Massachusetts monetary legislation beforehand and afterwards: the lack of a formal legal 
tender status for contractual debts, the lack of land backing, and the roundabout way in 
which paper money was supported (i.e., anti-grain discrimination). I also explain the 
anomalous policy of promising to convert the notes into everything the government did 
not physically have (movable assets), but not promising conversion into the only thing 
the government did physically have (land). All these odd facts do make sense if a single 
behavioral assumption is made; namely that the government maximized political profit 
subject to constraints. At the very least, the hypothesis follows Occam’s Razor. 
  The idea that lack of specie automatically means no backing with any tangible assets 
is widely accepted today and is based on numerous historical instances. However, it is 
anachronistic to assume that early Americans thought the same way. The 1690 currency 
was not a simple wartime substitution of convertibility with a legal tender law. The 
colonists definitely had land in mind. In fact, it was the success of the 1690 innovation 
under unique circumstances which proved a general principle in monetary theory: 
convertibility and backing with real assets are not necessary. As Cotton Mather 
predicted
95, Massachusetts inspired other legislatures all over the world to easily abandon 
specie convertibility in favor of legal tender laws in times of crisis, typically without 
consideration for convertibility into goods or backing with land.  
  This precedent was not simply one more variation on the legal status of money. Most 
pre-1690 currencies had had intrinsic value, while token currencies had been supported 
                                                 
95 Mather, Pietas, p. 43.   30
by forcing the government to convert them into goods, and/or by forcing private sellers to 
do so in the marketplace. Legal tender laws had been mainly used to solve legal disputes. 
The 1690 paper money was a conceptual shift from tangible assets (specie, goods, land) 
to monetary obligations (taxes and the government’s debts) as the foundation of the 
monetary system. This was a critical landmark in monetary history. Its consequences will 
stay with us long after paper money gets completely replaced by electronic money.   31
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